Back nearly a month ago, we shared a story about how OuiHeberg, a hosting provider, had disclosed a breach to its members. You can read their email to their users in the LowEndTalk thread.
This promised to be a pretty hot thread. To refresh your member, @virtualizor commented:
We would just like to add that this security breach is not caused by Virtualizor as per the details shared by the Ouiheberg team.
Our internal teams have successfully reproduced the attack by executing a payload via their WHMCS add-on in communication with their API. Virtualizor denies this attack vector and has asked us to deny it as well to avoid “damaging” their brand image. The result is that the attacker did indeed go through Virtualizor via the WHMCS add-on.
And then promised:
We will communicate exactly how to exploit the vulnerability to Virtualizor in a video so that they can ‘try’ to patch this type of attack.
All right, get our your popcorn, kids!
Er…
Well, sorry if your popcorn got cold. Because as of this writing, OuiHeberg has never shared any proof of this Virtualizor bug.
Virtualizor followed up in the thread:
When we first posted that the attack was not carried out via Virtualizor, we had already been in communication with @ouiheberg. We were unable to reproduce the claimed attack scenario. We requested further data, but received no reply from @ouiheberg for two days, even after a follow-up. Consequently, we posted that the claim of the attack being conducted via Virtualizor could not be substantiated at that time.
Following our post, we are still awaiting the attack video that @ouiheberg is expected to share. If a genuine Proof-of-Concept (POC) existed, we would have issued a patch by now.
We had verified what was given and could not reproduce it as it was not a full POC or substantive proof. And after passage of time and no response we had to make the post stating this fact that for the current details provided by the OuiHeberg team, this was not a Virtualizor exploit. We still await further details from the OuiHeberg team.
We routinely audit Virtualizor for security flaws, so this is news to us.
The individual who contacted Virtualizor claimed to have a working exploit related to a module for a popular billing platform, but offered no factual information or proof-of-concept. They referenced specific lines of code that make no sense in terms of being exploitable in real-world scenarios, nor do they represent any meaningful attack vector from what we can see…
As of November 18, Virtualizor was still waiting:
Update : We have not yet received any further details / PoC / substantive proof of Virtualizor being vulnerable.
Five days later, they repeated their status:
Update : Multiple reminders have been sent to @ouiheberg . We have not yet received any further details / PoC / substantive proof of Virtualizor being vulnerable.
And there it stands.
I can certainly understand that OuiHeberg’s priority was to fix their environment and take care of their customers. But going on a month, you’d think they’d have had time to put together a brief explanation of what happened, especially since they called Virtualizor out in public.
Given that there’s been plenty of time to document the bug (never mind making a video, just a brief description of the problem), I think we have to conclude that Virtualizor was not at fault here.
So…what was?



















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